The transcript of a panel discussion marking the fiftieth anniversary of John Muth's "Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements" (Econometrica 1961). The panel consists of Michael Lovell, Robert Lucas, Dale Mortensen, Robert Shiller, and Neil Wallace. The discussion is moderated by Kevin Hoover and Warren Young. The panel touches on a wide variety of issues related to the rational-expectations hypothesis, including: its history, starting with Muth's work at Carnegie Tech; its methodological role; applications to policy; its relationship to behavioral economics; its role in the recent financial crisis; and its likely future.
eighties were thus a boomlet for Muth. But rational expectations was rapidly detached from its founder and experienced a boom multiple times larger: a search on "rational expectations" that doesn't condition on "Muth" turns up 509 citations in the seventies, 3,150 in the eighties, and 2,854 in the nineties. Rational expectations by the 1990s was a standard tool of economists, and its origins were hardly noted by younger generation.
Our purpose today is, in part, to rectify that -both to remember and to reflect.
We have assembled a distinguished panel of economists who were witnesses to the rise and integration of rational expectations into economics.
Our format today will be one of a group interview or witness seminar. Warren Young and I will take turns posing questions, sometimes to particular panelists and sometimes to the group. In all cases, we invite the panelists to chime in with whatever they think relevant on important points or things that we may be missing. We are looking both to understand the origins and growth of rational expectations in economics, its pluses and minuses, the battles fought over it, and to consider what place it will have in the economics of the future.
I now turn the floor over to Warren Young for the first question. MICHAEL LOVELL: I first really got to know Jack Muth in 1962-63 when he was a visiting scholar at the Yale's Cowles Foundation. We talked at length about rational expectations and compared it with a related concept, namely the concept of "implicit expectations," which had been developed by Edwin Mills in his study of inventory behavior. And later, in the following year, I moved to Carnegie Mellon, getting there in the same year that Bob Lucas did. Jack was, of course, already there, as was Dale
Mortensen. And when I got to Carnegie Mellon, I had just received an opportunity to study actual expectations data for 135 United States manufacturing firms in a panel stretching over several years. So I talked to Jack about how I should analyze the data, and he was extremely helpful. And indeed I must say that while I have been blessed with great professors, brilliant students and tremendous colleagues, no one was more helpful than Jack. He laid out the type of tests that should be run on the data. Muth strongly supported empirical testing of rational expectations. So those are my initial contacts with Jack Muth and the concept of rational expectations.
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ROBERT LUCAS: I came to GSIA in 1963 from Chicago. I knew Jack's paper, which was famous. I probably hadn't read it, but I knew about it. Zvi Griliches had told me, "pay attention to Jack Muth. He's a person you could learn something from." I think that was about as good as any advice I got during my career. I taught econometricsthat was a plum for me to teach Ph.D econometrics. It was a two-course sequence,
and Jack was the other teacher. So we talked a lot. Jack was a skier, so I filled in for a week in March while he was in Colorado. He then left me detailed instructions as to what to do, so it was easy. Then when he came back, he gave a couple lectures to my class, which I sat in on. He was a smart guy. At some point I'm going to quarrel with
Kevin's introduction: we don't want to go back to all the people who used the words "rational" and "expectations," back to Adam Smith. Muth's idea of rational expectations -whether the term was a good one or not -. . . no one had said anything like this before. It was his simultaneous determination of people's behavior which produced a time series and a time series which led people to form expectations that affected their behavior. It's that simultaneity that neither the statisticians nor the economists of the day had . . . and Jack had it.
DALE MORTENSEN:
I'm the student of the bunch, as was already revealed. When these two arrived, I was a student starting to think about a thesis. Before they arrived, I obviously was badly advised, because I never took Jack's course. huge effect on all of us -and especially Jack. But Jack says, "It is sometimes argued that sometimes the assumption of rationality in economics leads to theories inconsistent with, or inadequate to explain, observed phenomena, especially changes over time" [Muth 1961, p. 316] . Then he says "e.g. Simon" and cites a paper. Then he says "Our hypothesis is based on exactly the opposite point of view" [Muth 1960, p. 316] . So, this is a shy graduate student taking on, not just a professor, but the most respected professor, who was and a huge influence on Jack for the rest of his life.
HOOVER: Anyone else on this topic?
NEIL WALLACE: Dale mentioned that dynamics was in the air when he was a graduate student at Carnegie, and I'd just like to reflect a little about dynamics and non dynamics in economics. I was a graduate student in the University of Chicago from '60 to '63, and I had heard about -or maybe read -Muth's paper. I vaguely recall his dictum: "model the agents as if they know the model." Maybe later, we will discuss whether that dictum can be reconciled with discovering a model. But anyway, in some sense dynamics gets introduced in economics in the late 19 th century. Irving
Fisher is, of course, a major figure. He said rather than "apples" and "oranges" on the axes, put "date-1 good" and "date-2 good." That's a huge insight, because it says look at the entire time path as an object. Operations research is over. The students like we had, they were engineers just out of school. They didn't know how to tie a tie. We thought we were models for corporate America. {laughter} We wore suits. Modern MBA students are a totally different breed -they're smart guys, but they're totally different.
HOOVER:
Earlier, when you were talking about the concept of rational expectations, everybody was treating it as one of those ideas that when you see it, you just see that it's right. It's like the invention of the button or something like that, even though it took a long time for people to come up with it. I'd like to quote from the introduction to Lucas and Sargent's famous anthology of articles on rational expectations [Lucas and Sargent 1981] . In the introduction, they write: "Muth's hypothesis is a contribution of the most fundamental kind, an idea that compels rethinking on many dimensions with consequent enthusiasm and resistance" [Lucas and Sargent 1981, p. xi] There's nothing we've heard so far that speaks at all to the resistance to rational expectations when it was first introduced to macroeconomics around 1970. I wonder if we can get the panel to speak a little bit about that resistance, holding yourself to the period of that first introduction in the 'seventies.
SHILLER:
When I was a graduate student at MIT, I was writing under Franco
Modigliani. I thought that the rational expectations was exciting, and so I wrote my dissertation, and it was titled "Rational Expectations and the Term Structure of Interest
Rates." But I have to say that all along I had doubts about it. I guess that's healthy, right? Your minister will tell you that: it's healthy to have doubts. I applied it to the term structure of interest rates back then, because I thought that's where it's really going to work, because you've got all these professional portfolio managers, and they're managing bond portfolios. He knew both theses, but he didn't see that they were saying very similar things.
I have a lot to say about this. I put on my reading list a wonderful description of the efficient-markets hypothesis -by Charles Conant, 1904 .. He has a beautiful essay about speculation and markets and the function of speculation and how all these speculators, trying to make profits, create a price, not just for today; they create a price for tomorrow and a price for next year and all relevant years in the futures markets. And, then, people who are planning have all these price indicators.
It's laid out very nicely around 1910. He didn't call it the "efficient-markets hypothesis;" but it was a little glib too. Anyway, he never got famous for it. He was however a great writer. So, the efficient-markets hypothesis was well known from, I with some of my macro colleagues--many of whom were educated at MIT. They were very surprised that someone would even ask that question. So, yes, Bob's work on expectations and neutrality was a huge thing that had to upset a lot of the profession.
It was revolutionary in that substantive way, but it was also revolutionary in terms of modeling strategy. It's hard to overstate the sense in which it was revolutionary in that regard.
LOVELL: I'd like to answer your question in a slightly negative way. Jack Muth was not the first to develop the concept of rational expectations. He gave it a name, but the concept itself had been invoked by Herbert Simon in his 1956 certainty equivalence article and by Hans Theil in a related paper. Certainty equivalence is the proposition that you can, under certain restrictive conditions, including no non-negative constraints, find the optimal solution to a dynamic programming problem under uncertainty by solving a much simpler problem obtained by substituting point estimates for the probability distribution of possible future states of the world. By using the means of that distribution as certainty equivalents, you get the same set of optimal decisions as you would if you labored through the uncertainty problem. But in order to prove his theorem, Herb had to invoke the assumption that the expectation had certain stochastic properties, and these turn out to be the properties of rational expectations that became famous a few years later. So perhaps we should ask, why did the assumption of rational expectations not take hold sooner than it did since it was necessary to prove Simon's famous theorem. Herb didn't give it a name; and his explanation of the assumption he made was a little befuddled, but it was definitely there and it is definitely required for certainty equivalence to go through. And it is a symbiotic relationship because Herb's certainty equivalence underlies much of Muth's 1960 Econometrica article: Muth invoked Simon's certainty equivalence proposition to justify using the point-estimated form of rational expectations in a variety of applications, including his critique of the cobweb theorem.
LUCAS:
The idea that there is no long-run Phillips curve is not mine; it's Friedman's and Phelps's. And I had a Phillips curve. Leonard Rapping and I worked out a model which we got a Phillips curve out of. And we did not apply rational expectations in that model. In fact, there was a long-run Phillips curve, if our model were true. We read Friedman's paper, which seemed to us right -it was just a conflict. A standard way to look at long-run effects in a difference-equation model that all of use were using at that point was to calculate the short-run, impact multiplier (as we used to call it), and the long-run multiplier, and look at the long-run multiplier: it was zero or it wasn't; it was whatever it was. And with Rapping's and my Phillips curve, it was a tradeoff. A lot of people tested -so-called -Friedman and Phelps ideas, and they all rejected it. So did we. This is just a fact of the data, if this was your test. So, what I was trying to do -and did -was to get out of that bind. For that, changing from adaptive expectations, which Rapping and I had used, to rational expectations did the trick and gave new life to the Friedman-Phelps argument. It was a question of evidence and how you interpret evidence, not just a question of which theory is the prettiest.
HOOVER: I want to follow up on this. You have a paper about 1970 -I think it was
published a few years later -on the econometric testing of the natural rate hypothesis.
Lucas 1972b]. And one of the interesting things about that paper -because now your position is "well, its all in Friedman; I didn't have that much of an innovation" -is, if I remember it correctly, that you used Friedman as your whipping boy: "Friedman talks about natural rate, but he doesn't really have a natural rate, because this thing never comes back to equilibrium because of the kind of expectations he assumed."
LUCAS:
Friedman just had a pure theoretical model, and he didn't explain why all the econometricians disagreed with him -including me and Rapping. So, in the end, I
think, in some sense, Friedman was right, but you've got to look at the evidence . . .
HOOVER:
I am just suggesting that . . .
LUCAS:
and get some kind of story . . . HOOVER: Warren was trying to push you on really fine-detailed microhistory.
Historians take a really long perspective, and 36 years doesn't seem like much. But I'll shift it back to a broader question. The anthology that I mentioned before -the
Lucas and Sargent anthology -was entitled Rational Expectations and Econometric
Practice [Lucas and Sargent 1981] . The question is, how important was rational expectations to econometrics and how important was econometrics to rational expectations? Is the main contribution of rational expectations a contribution to economic theory or a contribution to econometrics?
LUCAS:
Before rational expectations, a lot of people were formulating distributed lag models of expectations with a lot of free parameters. It was easy to rationalize these. Now, rational expectations just imposed that every free parameter you throw into the model is going to give you a testable hypothesis. So, all of sudden, you are going from a model which is more or less vacuous to a model which has eighteen restrictions and is not going to pass an F-test for anything. You go from acceptance to rejection.
Sargent wrote a paper about the Fisher hypothesis on inflation expectations and interest rates, that the interest rate is driven by the expectation of all these future 30 prices, which wasn't as tight as a term-structure test, and it had seemed to look pretty good for Fisher. But Sargent showed that when you impose all these restrictions implied by rational expectations, it just fails. This had a very big effect . . . it seemed like, all of a sudden, instead of macro being a thing where we could write down any damn model and claim that it was consistent with the data, it turned into a field in which anything that you wrote was going to get rejected right away. So, the way people were doing their testing and estimation changed a lot with rational expectations.
HOOVER:
Can I get anyone else to comment on rational expectations and econometrics.
WALLACE: I would just say that rational expectations brought structural estimation into macro.
Then, by structural estimation you mean something different from the Cowles-Commission-inspired large macromodels of the 'fifties and'sixties.
WALLACE:
Yeah, I guess I do.
HOOVER: Do you want to characterize that difference?
WALLACE: Well, it's about the standards you require in positing the underlying structure that generates the observation.
SHILLER:
The core idea that underlies this is that people have tastes and technology and they have tradeoffs in their preferences. That's the underlying structure. We have to go from that to a macro model -and an intertemporal model where people live for a hundred years at least for a long time. If you start from that framework of optimizing your utility function, every decision you make depends on your expectation of every economic variable into the distant future. And when you think about it from that perspective, writing down some arbitrary model of the FRB-MIT variety doesn't sound exactly right because you are sweeping under the rug too much. 5 Maybe that's what you were saying HOOVER: Let me follow up on my question to make it more pointed so that Mike
Lovell and others can comment on it. In 1986, Mike, you wrote a pretty well known paper in which you examined the empirical success of a variety of alternatives to rational expectations, including adaptive expectations, structural expectations, and implicit expectations [Lovell 1986 ]. And in your paper, rational expectations does not dominate these alternatives. You even cite a paper by Muth, which comes down more or less in favor of implicit expectations. What I am wondering, then, is that, given the way that you have approached this empirically or the way it could be approached empirically, does this mean that we should find an alternative to rational expectations or are there other expectational approaches that are an empirical complement to rational expectations?
LOVELL: I wish Jack Muth could be here to answer that question, but obviously he can't because he died just as Hurricane Wilma was zeroing in on his home on the He had got hold of the data from five business firms, including expectations data, analyzed it, and found that the rational expectations model did not pass the empirical test. He went on to say
It is a little surprising that serious alternatives to rational expectations have never really been proposed. My original paper was largely a reaction against very naïve expectations hypotheses juxtaposed with highly rational decisionmaking behavior and seems to have been rather widely misinterpreted.
Two directions seem to be worth exploring: (1) explaining why smoothing rules work and their limitations and (2) incorporating well known cognitive biases into expectations theory (Kahneman and Tversky). It was really incredible that so little has been done along these lines.
Muth also said that his results showed that expectations were not in accordance with the facts about forecasts of demand and production. He then advanced an alternative to rational expectations. That alternative he called an "errors-in-thevariables" model. That is to say, it allowed the expectation error to be correlated with both the realization and the prediction. Muth found that his errors-in-variables model worked better than rational expectations or Mills' implicit expectations, but it did not entirely pass the tests. In a shortened version of his paper published in the Eastern Economic Journal Muth [1985, p 200] he reported:.
The results of the analysis do not support the hypotheses of the naive, exponential, extrapolative, regressive, or rational models. Only the expectations revision model used by Meiselman is consistently supported by the statistical results... These conclusions should be regarded as highly tentative and only suggestive, however, because of the small number of firms studied.
Muth thought that we should not only have rational expectations, but if we're going to have rational behavioral equations, then consistency requires that our model include rational expectations. But he was also interested in the results of people who do behavioral economics, which at that time was a very undeveloped area.
HOOVER: Does anyone else want to comment on issue of testing rational expectations against alternatives and if it matters whether rational expectations stands up to empirical tests or whether it is not the sort of thing for which testing would be relevant?
What comes to my mind is that rational expectations models have to assume away the problem of regime change, and that makes them hard to apply. It's the same If you don't have data on subprime mortgages then you build a model that doesn't have subprime mortgages in it. Also, it doesn't have the shadow banking sector in it either. Omitting key variables because we don't have the data history on them creates a fundamental problem That's why many nice concepts don't find their way into empirical models and are not used more. They remain just a conceptual model. generally -regime changes is only one of them -you were talking about institutional change that was or wasn't anticipated. As a theorist, I don't know how to handle that.
HOOVER:

Bob, did you want to comment on that? You're looking unhappy, I thought.
LUCAS:
No. I mean, you can't read Muth's paper as some recipe for cranking out true theories about everything under the sun -we don't have a recipe like that. My paper on expectations and the neutrality of money was an attempt to get a positive theory about what observations we call a Phillip's curve. Basically it didn't work. After several years, trying to push that model in a direction of being more operational, it didn't seem to explain it. So we had what we call price stickiness, which seems to be central to the way the system works. I thought my model was going to explain price stickiness, and it didn't. So we're still working on it; somebody's working on it. I don't think we have a satisfactory solution to that problem, but I don't think that's a cloud over Muth's work. If Jack thinks it is, I don't agree with him. Mike cites some data that Jack couldn't make sense out of using rational expectations . . . There're a lot 35 of bad models out there. I authored my share, and I don't see how that affects a lot of things we've been talking about earlier on about the value of Muth's contribution.
YOUNG:
Just to wrap up the issue of possible alternatives to rational expectations or complements to rational expectations. Does behavioral economics or psychology in general provide a useful and viable alternative to rational expectations, with the emphasis on useful. {laughter} SHILLER: Well that's the criticism of behavioral economics, that it doesn't provide elegant models. If you read Kahnemann and Tversky, they say that preferences have a kink in them, and that kink moves around depending on framing. But framing is hard to pin down. So we don't have any elegant behavioral economics models. The job isn't done, and economists have to read widely and think about these issues. I am sorry, I don't have a good answer. My opinion is that behavioral economics has to be on the reading list. Ultimately, the whole rationality assumption is another thing; it's interesting to look back on the history of it. Back at the turn of the century -around 1900 -when utility-maximizing economic theory was being discovered, it was described as a psychological theory -did you know that, that utility maximization was a psychological theory? There was a philosopher in 1916 -I remember reading, in the Quarterly Journal of Economics -who said that the economics profession is getting steadily more psychological.
6 {laughter} And what did he mean? He said that economists are putting people at the center of the economy, and they're realizing that people have purposes and they have objectives and they have trade-offs. It is not just that I want something, I'll consider different combinations and I'll tell you what I like about that. And he's saying that before this happened, economists weren't psychological; they believed in such things as gold or venerable institutions, and they didn't talk about people. Now the whole economics profession is focused on people.
And he said that this is a long-term trend in economics. And it is a long-term trend, so the expected utility theory is a psychological theory, and it reflects some important insights about people. In a sense, that's all we have, behavioral economics; and it's just that we are continuing to develop and to pursue it. The idea about rational expectations, again, reflects insights about people -that if you show people recurring patterns in the data, they can actually process it -a little bit like an ARIMA modeland they can start using some kind of brain faculties that we do not fully comprehend. [1936] is that, if people are really thoroughly rational, they would be paralyzed into inaction, because they just don't know. They don't know the kind of things that you would need to put into a decision-theory framework. But they do act, and so there is something that drives people -it's animal spirits. You're lying in bed in the morning and you could be thinking, "I don't know what's going to happen to me today; I could get hit by a truck; I just will stay in bed all day. But you don't. So animal spirits is the core of -maybe I'm telling this too bluntly -. . . but it fluctuates. Sometimes it is represented as confidence, but it is not necessarily confidence. It is trust in each other, our sense of whether other people think that we're moving ahead or . . . something like that. I believe that's part of what drives the economy. It's in our book, and it's not very well modeled yet. But Keynes never wrote his theory down as a model either.
He couldn't do it; he wasn't ready. These are ideas that, even to this day, are fuzzy.
But they have a hold on people. I'm sure that Ben Bernanke and Austin Goolsbee are influenced by John Maynard Keynes, who was absolutely not a rational-expectations theorist. And that's another strand of thought. In my mind, the strands are not resolved, and they are both important ways of looking at the world. 
WALLACE:
Well, yeah, I can't imagine doing economics without this. Rational expectations models people as being in touch with the world that they are living in.
It's probably politically incorrect, but one definition of insanity is that you're not in touch. So, I don't know what else to do.
LOVELL:
The answer depends in part on what definition you give of "rational expectations." So, I suspect that if you want to predict the future you will have to ask Thomas Kuhn.
SHILLER:
Ok, I'm willing to bet that 50 years from now we will still be talking about rational expectations.
[Thomas] Kuhn talks about scientific revolutions throwing out theories. This is not a theory that's going to be completely thrown out. It is might be deemphasized, but it's, as you say, an equilibrium concept and a basic modeling technique that is applicable in certain circumstances. And we'll still be debating -I won't be -but in 50 or 100 years we'll still have the same tensions. We have different competing models that each has its own life. They each capture something, and they capture it imperfectly. Economics is not an exact science. We're never going to resolve that one of them is right and that one of them is wrong.
